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human-centric agenda of sustainable peace, a concept with the potential – if defined with sufficiently radical,
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“What I propose, therefore, is very simple:  it is nothing more 
than to think what we are doing.” Hannah Arendt (1958, p. 5) 
 
 The debate around the extent to which environmental problems constitute security threats 
is a long-standing one. Thirty years ago, the World Commission on Environment and 
Development—more commonly known as the Brundtland Commission—argued the “whole 
notion of security as traditionally understood in terms of political and military threats to national 
sovereignty—must be expanded to include the growing impacts of environmental stress—
locally, nationally, regionally, and globally.” Not surprisingly, they concluded: “there are no 
military solutions to ‘environmental insecurity’” (WCED, 1987, p. 19). Thus began three 
decades of dispute amongst scholars and policy-makers about where the appropriate focus lay: 
on ways to deal with environmental problems in order to prevent conflict, and/or ways to prepare 
militarily for conflict inevitably arising from a deteriorating global environment—resource 
scarcity, reduction of arable land, mass migration of so-called environmental refugees, and so on 
(see Dalby, 1992; Dalby, 2002; Trombetta, 2008). For some, such crises can be contemplated 
and contained within the familiar conceptual terrain of state-centric language; they seek to 
“securitize” environmental issues and shore up traditional notions of sovereignty and the 
centrality of the state in the global order. Others fear the limiting effects of viewing such 
qualitatively unprecedented, transnational challenges through the lens of state security; in order 
to place the security of the planet and interests of humanity above that of states, they seek a 
radical reconceptualization of sovereignty. Though the academic debate has been intense, in 
most corridors of power there has been little movement away from the traditional, state-centric 
framing of global environmental deterioration in terms of state security. It is my contention, 
however, that a re-conceptualization of the security/environment nexus has never been more 
crucial.   
  Following a brief discussion about the substance and shaping of the climate change crisis, 
I will argue that an effective response implies and requires a change in the conceptual climate of 
the debate sufficient to break the vicious cycle dragging the planet, at accelerating rates, to 
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disaster. The circular argument that environmental problems, caused in part by the multiple 
impacts of industrial militarism and conflict, can be addressed by new military strategies, 
spending, and responses will not succeed and will instead serve to exacerbate political tensions 
and inflict further ecological harm. Following this general critique, I will concentrate on a region 
already brutally harmed (with grave global implications) by this vicious cycle: the Arctic. 
Already reeling from the ecological and cultural ravages of colonialism and now experiencing a 
degree of climate change which is, alas, seen as creating openings for oil and gas development 
and an increasingly militarized exercise of sovereignty, this region offers a useful case study 
precisely because the Indigenous peoples who inhabit the land have both a better understanding 
of the concept of global environmental security and have articulated a view of the fluidity of the 
concept of sovereignty, which recognizes the ongoing existence of states while at the same time 
pointing in a direction that recognizes the overlapping nature of both human identities and 
security concerns. In so doing, this renewed conceptualization of sovereignty can assist us with 
envisioning the ways in which state leaders, international organizations, global non-
governmental organizations and, indeed, citizens, can all participate in the global effort to 
confront environmental insecurity. 
  A consideration of earlier attempts—such as that undertaken at the 1972 Dai Dong 
Conference—to persuade policy makers of the logical necessity to consider environmental 
problems beyond the orthodoxy of sovereign state rights, and through a new prism of 
cooperation, helps highlight the high costs of the long failure to affect such a paradigm shift. A 
consideration of earlier attempts—such as that undertaken at the 1972 Dai Dong Conference—to 
persuade policy makers of the logical necessity to consider environmental problems beyond the 
orthodoxy of sovereign state rights, and through a new prism of cooperation, helps highlight the 
high costs of the long failure to affect such a paradigm shift. This paper can be seen, then, as an 
exercise in reviving awareness of largely forgotten but still relevant attempts to think “outside 
the box” of state sovereignty, a concept that has always been less stable than assumed by many 
scholars of international relations (Biersteker & Weber, 1996).  An effort will be made to move 
the discussion forward in an innovative way by highlighting an example of a conceptualization 
of sovereignty that demonstrates the possibility of maintaining state identities while at the same 
time recognizing our overlapping identities as concerned citizens on a fragile planet, with a 
shared interest in confronting existential ecological threats. Nayak and Selbin (2010) are 
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certainly correct to note that we “tend to treat sovereignty as a given, or theorize it in the context 
of the nation-state system, rather than explore how people might negotiate what sovereignty 
means” (p. 41).    
  In the course of the analysis, I will contrast the state-centric status quo with the human-
centric agenda of sustainable peace, a concept with the potential—if defined with sufficiently 
radical, transnational rigour, and not simply utilized to offer a set of platitudes to mask the 
continuation of business as usual—to disrupt and transform the traditional sovereignty paradigm, 
and thereby tackle the root causes and worst effects of both the general and specific, global and 
Arctic, crises. I close by drawing on both Western and Indigenous political theory to ask what we 
think we mean by—or have come to accept as—“peace” and “power.” There exists a fresh 
approach that can help us in our quest to move beyond the rigidity of a Realist understanding of 
sovereignty with its commitment to domination and control and all the negative consequences 
such an approach entails for the natural world. 
  Climate Change and State Sovereignty  
  Remarkably, after almost three decades of convincing research undertaken by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the contention that climate change poses a 
real, growing, “manmade,” existential threat to the planet remains, in some powerful quarters, 
controversial. Joseph Stiglitz (2017) recently argued that the Trump Administration’s withdrawal 
from the Paris accords should lead the world to view the U.S. as a “rogue state,” a concept that 
has been defined in more academic terms as any state that “actively blocks, stalls, or otherwise 
subverts an international process designed in the interests of all” (Broadhead, 2001, p. 462). The 
truth, alas, is that the U.S. (the world’s premier polluter) has never played a leading (or even 
strong) role in global efforts to articulate systemic adjustments—economic, political, conceptual, 
and cultural—required to alter the damaging course the world is pursuing. From the lead-up to 
the Kyoto Protocol negotiations—when the U.S. was backed by its “enablers” in the so-called 
JUSCANZ group of Japan, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—through the two decades 
since, U.S. negotiators have sought to reduce targets and have argued for countless “flexible” 
ways to reach them without making deep cuts in domestic emissions. 
 The U.S. Congress, with its commitment to the U.S. economy over other considerations, 
refused to ratify even the half-measures offered at Kyoto, setting the stage for President George 
W. Bush’s rejection of its allegedly “job-killing” commitments. And while President Barack 
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Obama played an important role at the Paris Conference, his Administration was the prime 
mover (particularly at the unimpressive Copenhagen Conference in 2009) behind the 
abandonment of binding reduction targets, long understood as a precondition of serious progress.   
Indeed, WikiLeaks cables confirm what many had previously suspected:  at Copenhagen, the U.S. 
resorted to financial bribes and political threats to gain support for its non-binding approach. In what 
he refers to as “institutionalized patterns of disrespect at the level of international negotiations,” 
Brincat (2015) points to the U.S. use of “spying, threats, and promises of aid” (p. 301). As Bolivia’s 
U.N. Ambassador, Pablo Solon, remarked,  
WikiLeaks confirms the pressures and blackmail exerted by the U.S. administration in the 
talks. They accuse us [in the cables] of being “political and ideological.”  But all we want to 
do is to hold temperature rise to 1.5C. Is that political or ideological?  (as cited in 
Carrington, 2010)  
 
  While the Paris Conference briefly restored the sense of common purpose and 
determination lost at Copenhagen, it did not represent the breakthrough required. Instead of 
serious targets and promised action, the Conference instead settled for agreement on the vague 
aim to keep the rise in global temperatures to “well below” 2 degrees Celsius with an “endeavour 
to limit” the rise even more. Amid the fanfare, reports noted, “scientists point out that the Paris 
Accord must be stepped up if it is to have any chance of curbing dangerous climate change,” 
with the “pledges” made “thus far,” even if fully implemented, likely to see global temperatures 
rise by as much as 2.7C” (BBC News Online, 2017). In despair, former NASA scientist James 
Hansen, sometimes referred to as the “father of climate change awareness,” called the agreement 
“a fraud really, a fake”:  
It’s just bullshit for them to say “we’ll have a 2C warming target and then try to do a little 
better every five years.” It’s just worthless words. There is no action, just promises. As 
long as fossil fuels appear to be the cheapest fuels out there, they will continue to be 
burned. (Milman, 2015)  
Hansen, in effect, is calling for a reconceptualization of economic growth in an age of global 
warming and such a reconceptualization, I believe, must necessarily entail a broader re-visioning 
of the central concepts of sovereignty and security. 
5 
 
  Earlier this year Rachel Bronson, Executive Director and Publisher of the Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists introduced the 2017 Doomsday Clock Statement, published annually by the 
Bulletin’s Science and Security Board—the 70th anniversary of a powerful symbol of our 
collective fate—with eloquent reference to the “existential threats” posed by nuclear weapons 
and climate change: 
In 1947 there was one technology with the potential to destroy the planet, and 
that was nuclear power. Today, rising temperatures, resulting from the 
industrial-scale burning of fossil fuels, will change life on Earth as we know it, 
potentially destroying or displacing it from significant portions of the world, 
unless action is taken today, and in the immediate future. (Bronson, 2017, p. 2) 
 
  The Statement warns that “inaction and brinkmanship” on climate change and nuclear 
sabre rattling are “endangering every person, everywhere on Earth.” And it offered no comfort 
about who might “lead humanity away from global disaster,” noting the recent election of 
Donald Trump had already “made a bad international security situation worse.” But, despite his 
absurd demonization of climate change science as a “hoax,” Trump can hardly be blamed for the 
profound, decades-long failure of the most powerful members of the international community to, 
as the Statement urges, “take the steps needed to begin the path toward a net zero-carbon-
emissions world” (Bronson, pp. 3-4).   
  It is this political climate, an ecologically toxic atmosphere of state-centric self-
congratulation, that fuels and locks in place the vicious cycle sketched above. The ecologically 
devastating impacts of militarized sovereignty have long been identified, charted, and analyzed. 
Likewise, my call for “concept change”—demilitarizing and de-nationalizing security—in 
response to climate change is nothing new. The question, though, is why nothing remotely 
serious enough has been done? The answer can be found by examining the cycle more closely. 
Militarism and the Environment: The Vicious Cycle and the War on Nature 
  For the world’s major powers and most of their allies, fidelity to state-centric security is 
inseparable from devotion to militarism as a “legitimate” and “normal” instrument of policy and 
aspect of power projection. Even in the absence of armed conflict, the human, socio-economic 
and environmental consequences of maintaining a large-scale military-industrial capability are 
frequently severe. The cycle is vicious indeed. Militarism exacerbates environmental crises 
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caused primarily by the narrow pursuit of national security and competitive advantage. And 
when the scale of the ecological crisis is presented, militarism is invoked and deployed to help 
“solve” the problems it will then again make worse. Despite decades of scholarship and science  
exposing the follies of militarized security, and despite the end of the Cold War and the broken 
promise of a “peace dividend” capable of making real differences in people’s lives, we continue 
to witness obscene worldwide expenditure on militarism—$1,676 billion dollars in 2015 (Perlo-
Freeman, 2016)—with predicable results: environmental deterioration and human insecurity.   
 At each stage of the military-industrial process—from the mining of resources for use in 
the making of weapons of war, through the development, testing, production, storage, disposal 
and, of course the lethal use of those weapons, ecological damage is inflicted. Even disarmament 
and decommissioning of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, presents formidable challenges, 
while the question of what to do with stockpiles of banned chemical and biological weapons 
continues to haunt the global community (Lawrence, Stemberger, Zolderdo, Struthers, & Cooke, 
2015; Rando, 2014; Hynes, 2015).  
  Of course, as mentioned above, it is the final stage of the military industrial process, war 
itself, that does the greatest harm. The contamination of land, water, and air is an inevitable 
consequence of modern military conflict, and the associated effects on food sources, livestock, 
wildlife, and of course human health, are often horrific. Examples from the two wars in Iraq 
serve to make the point clear. First, an estimated 1,200 tons of Depleted Uranium (DU), a by-
product of uranium enrichment with both chemical and radiological toxicity, was used by 
American forces in the Gulf War, spreading contamination “widely in the air, soil and water, 
particularly as dust in windstorms.” (Fathi, Matti, Al-Saligh, & Godbold, 2013; Al-Azzawi, 
2006, p. 23). While debates swirl around the verifiable harm caused—there are “deniers” here as 
in the climate change case—hard evidence abounds to justify and motivate international efforts 
to ban all military use of DU (White, 2008). And in that same brutal conflict, Saddam Hussein 
responded by also using environmental destruction as a weapon of war, first by setting fire to 
over 500 oil wells, causing massive air pollution and possible climate change effects, and then by 
releasing large volumes of oil into the Persian Gulf, destroying fragile marshlands and 
devastating animal, bird, marine life, and more (Ross, 1992). Subsequently, it is estimated that 
between 2003 and 2007 the war in Iraq generated at least 141 million metric tons of carbon 
dioxide—a figure that Oil Change International (2008) placed in stark context:  
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If the war was ranked as a country in terms of emissions, it would emit more CO2 each 
year than 139 of the world’s nations do annually. Falling between New Zealand and 
Cuba, the war each year emits more than 60% of all countries. (p. 4) 
 
  Perhaps the most infamous environmental war crime remains the American 
weaponization of seventy-two million liters of herbicides and defoliants in Vietnam, ravaging 
forests, food supplies, water, soil, and even the offshore fishery (Majeed, 2004). The effects, of 
course, did not stop with the War. A national health survey conducted in 1999, long after the 
initial waves of infant mortality, miscarriages, and malformations, found one million people, and 
50,000 children, suffering from Agent-Orange associated diseases (Palmer, 2007).   
 Militarism also consumes vast amounts of natural, as well as financial, resources. A 2007 
report from the Brookings Institute (Lengyel, 2007) found that the Department of Defense (DoD) 
accounted for 93 percent of the U.S. government’s oil consumption, a percentage dropping to a 
still stratospheric 78 percent by 2015 (USEIA, 2015). Indeed, if we take 2015 figures, the DoD 
oil consumption is roughly equivalent to that of Sweden. Fossil-fuel dependency is, not 
surprisingly, at the root of decisions designed to protect supplies, compounding environmental 
problems that militarism is then expected to solve. The destructive cycle continues.   
  Despite many valiant attempts, academic and political, to recast the notion of security in 
terms commensurate to the human and natural crises generated by inter-state conflict and 
competition, both academic security studies as well as mainstream discourse remains rooted in 
the paradigm causing the problem. Thus, when security experts and pundits (often retired 
military officials) expound on the security ramifications of climate change, the search is for ways 
in which the militarization of security can be maintained. That is to say, discussions about 
potential conflicts have climate change considerations added to them. At a time when the 
potential for “water wars” (and mass-migration) triggered by climate change is growing, the 
“need” for a military response or solution can seem obvious and logical, but such orthodox 
analysis is blind to the needs and vulnerabilities of the global ecosystem and fails entirely to 
address the causes (including militarism itself) of accelerating human and natural insecurity. 
  To examine this orthodoxy more closely, we can consider a June 2017 report identifying 
“12 major epicenters of climate risks to international security,” based on research conducted by 
the non-partisan Center for Climate and Security, a think-tank whose Advisory Board includes 
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sixteen retired senior military officials and eight security and foreign policy experts. 
Unsurprisingly, the focus of the Center’s attention is on the threat to states from climate 
change—an “accelerant of instability”—rather than the impact of state-centrism on the planet.  
The report, and its associated video animation: 
…includes analyses of 12 significant climate and security epicenters….These 
epicenters were chosen due to their nature as risks to critical parts of the 
international nation-state system (food, water, trade, health, cities, sovereignty) 
that ripple out into serious global security cases, especially if happening in 
tandem.  The epicenters span the globe, and many are fundamentally 
interconnected.”  (Center for Climate and Security, 2017) 
 
  Such language and focus typify status quo thinking on potential climate change impacts 
on “us.” NATO, for example, certainly takes the threat seriously, and is doubtless sincere in its 
concern. That concern, though, is directed solely at the “risk factors” complicating the traditional 
exercise of state and military power—its own legitimacy and utility, in other words—rather than 
the risk to the environment and humanity of that “threatened” status quo. In a 2015 Strategic 
Foresight Analysis, for example, NATO notes— 
Global environmental change and its impacts are becoming readily apparent and 
are projected to increase in the future…. All indicators suggest that the trend is 
still valid and increasing in regard to severity of extreme weather events and 
other impacts such as melting polar and glacial ice. However, it is still uncertain 
what the environmental effects will be by the end of the 21st century. This 
uncertainty is complicated further by the fact that climate change-related 
environmental effects may have second or third order effects on other domains 
(e.g., economic, resources, urbanization, and demographics) and may also be 
affected by future trends in these domains. The severity of this development will 
potentially increase the number of conflicts based on a mix of different trends 
and drivers in combination with environmental and climate change. These 
conflicts may threaten global stability and security and may therefore impact 
directly or indirectly on the members of the Alliance. (Supreme Allied 
Commander Transformation, 2015, p. 29) 
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  Such seemingly unobjectionable assertions can obscure their own, underlying 
assumption:  the existence of a basically sound, stable and secure world order—in which NATO, 
a nuclear-armed, expanding military alliance is seen and appreciated as normal and natural—
may soon come under an unprecedented degree and kind of stress. In sum, powerful states and 
the organizations they have created to maintain their dominance refuse to relinquish their long-
held view that the way to deal with threats, regardless of the cause, is through the state-centric 
exercise of military power. In such a worldview, a view of the world as central is the most 
threatening thing of all: an alien concept. 
“Sustainable Peace”: Challenging the Orthodoxy? 
  In 2003, with the environmental impact of the wars in the Balkans under review and fresh 
devastation evident in Afghanistan, Klaus Toepfer, then-Executive Secretary of the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) proposed legal protections for the environment. “We 
have the Geneva Conventions,” Toepfer argued, “aimed at safeguarding the rights of prisoners 
and civilians. We need similar safeguards for the environment” (as cited in Kirby, 2003). While 
it is true that the Geneva Conventions prohibit “widespread, long-term and severe” damage to 
the environment, UNEP (2009) argues that this “triple cumulative standard is nearly impossible 
to achieve, particularly given the imprecise definitions for the terms “widespread,” “long-term” 
and “severe.” As a result, Toepfer referred to both the environmental causes and consequences of 
war when he wrote: “Using the environment as a weapon must be universally condemned, and 
denounced as an international crime against humankind, against Nature” (as cited in Kirby, 
2003). The acknowledgement that struggles over natural resources frequently result in conflict 
leads logically to the suggestion that protecting the natural world, while ensuring a fair allocation 
of natural resources for peaceful development, is an important method for ensuring peace.  
  Toepfer’s 2003 statement foreshadowed the recent—and better known—UN effort to 
articulate the concept of sustainable peace, an integrated organizational approach to the 
maintenance of global security. By focusing on the root causes of conflict, the sustainable peace 
approach holds that “it will not be possible to achieve lasting peace in the long term without 
sustainable development, equitable economic opportunity, and human rights protection for all” 
(Thomson, 2017). 
  In January of this year, in his first address to the Security Council, Secretary General 
António Guterres enthusiastically endorsed this “new approach,” arguing that the 
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“interconnected nature of today’s crises require the international community co connect global 
efforts for peace and security, sustainable development and human rights, not just in words, but 
in practice.” With so many of today’s conflicts, he argued, “fueled by competition for power and 
resources,” and grievously “exacerbated by climate change, population growth and the 
globalization of crime and terror,” it is time to end the “boundless human suffering and the 
wanton waste of resources generated by conflict” (UNSC, 2017). 
  This sweeping objective can be seen as both revolutionary and restorative of the 
fundamental intent of the UN Charter to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” 
through an agenda of “positive peace.” What is new, compared to 1945, is the scale of risk to the 
planet from climate change triggered by industrialism and militarism. Thus, for peace to be 
sustainable the ecological indefensibility of war as an instrument of foreign policy must be 
acknowledged, most importantly in the most heavily-armed states and alliances. Instead of 
increasing defense budgets in an attempt to win wars stemming from resource shortages or the 
effects of climate change, the practitioners and proponents of militarized security need to 
confront the most inconvenient truth of all: that “putting poverty to the sword is,” as Toepfer (as 
cited in Kirby, 2003) argued, “the peace policy of the 21st Century.”   
  On April 27, 2016, the General Assembly and the Security Council jointly adopted the 
“Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its ninth session” (UNGA/UNSC, 2016) enshrining 
sustainable peace as integral to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Peace. Security Council 
Resolution 2282, adopted unanimously, notes that the concept “should be broadly understood as 
a goal and a process to build a common vision of a society” encompassing myriad “activities 
aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation, and recurrence of conflict.” (UNSC 
2016).  Despite this, there is little evidence that the necessary shift in “great power” thinking is 
taking place. President Trump’s decision to massively increase defense spending while 
abandoning even the non-binding Paris accord exemplifies the failure, and there is little reason to 
suggest that on a range of foreign policy issues a Hillary Clinton presidency would have been 
anything but hawkish and wholeheartedly committed to shoring up the American-led status quo 
(Zenko, 2016). This is not to suggest that the worldview of the two 2016 U.S. presidential 
candidates is identical; it is not. Both, though, view the world through the prism of U.S. 
superiority, sharing a belief in the power of American power—political, economic, and of course 
military—far transcending party platform and allegiance. And in Canada, the Trudeau 
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government has recently pledged a 70 percent increase ($62 billion) in military spending, much 
of it on major offensive weapon systems (warships, fighter planes, armed drones) over the next 
twenty years (LeBlanc & Chase, 2017) and contradicted its own sterling rhetoric on climate 
change by maintaining the woefully inadequate emissions reduction targets of the previous, 
Kyoto Accord-hating government of former Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper (Struzik, 
2017).  
  Sustainable peace can only be understood as fundamentally disruptive of the state-centric 
status quo if it is seriously pursued. If “concept change” is not part of its agenda, it will be co-
opted and compromised, and in the worst case serving as rhetorical cover for the unsustainable 
militarization of international relations, including militarized responses to climate change-related 
turmoil. The critical test of sustainable peace, then, will be its success or failure in bringing an 
end to the prevalence of militarized responses to environmental crises. 
  It is perhaps worth adding an important caveat to the Secretary General’s enthusiastic 
support for the increased acceptance of environmental protection as a key component of the 
sustainable/sustaining peace concept. The embrace of the concept of sustainable peace is both 
based, and builds, on the concept of sustainable development—a framing device that has been 
with us since the Brundtland Commission report Our Common Future released in 1987. We need 
to be mindful of the contradictions inherent in this original concept and in the initial arguments 
put forward by the Brundtland Commission. With its commitment to economic growth, foreign 
investment, and an expanded role for international financial institutions, sustainable development 
is a concept of which to be, at least, wary. (Visvanathan, 1991; Luke, 1995; Clow, 1996). It is 
true, however, that in many ways this concept has become a kind of “common sense” notion. 
When most people use it, they believe they are referring to an environmentally conscious 
worldview that would be an essential foundational belief to the broader conceptualization of 
sustainable peace. This deeper, more holistic vision is worth further exploration.  
Conceptual Deep Freeze: The Assault on the Arctic 
  Nowhere can the circular thinking of national security responses to climate change be 
demonstrated more graphically than the Arctic, a region on the front lines of the currently losing 
battle for a sustainable future (Broadhead, 2015).. In 2004, then-chair of the Inuit Circumpolar 
Conference (ICC), Sheila Watt Cloutier, stated in testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee 
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation:   
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If we can reverse the emission of climate change inducing greenhouse gases in 
time to save the Arctic from the most devastating impact of global warming, 
then we can spare untold suffering for hundreds of millions of people around the 
globe. Protect the Arctic and we Save the Planet.  (Watt-Cloutier, 2004)  
 
  As Watt Cloutier would surely agree, the response to this call from the “Canadian” Arctic 
(itself a profoundly misleading imperial construct), under both Liberal and Conservative 
leadership, has been nationalistic, militaristic, and opportunistic. Mounting evidence of 
unmanageable warming has been met not with a plausible action plan for radical emission 
reductions, but rather plans to exploit and extract the natural resources of the region in a manner 
compounding the problem.   
  In the context of this focus on concept change, it is important to stress that this 
approach did not begin, let alone end, with the internationally maligned government of Stephen 
Harper. Indeed, it was the Liberal Chretien government that first framed the Arctic crisis as a 
potential economic boon, seeing it as an opening for Canadian business rather than a calamity for 
indigenous inhabitants and all the life of the region (and beyond). While acknowledging the 
negative impacts of climate change (extreme weather, coastal erosion, flooding, etc.) the 
government’s 2000 report, Canada’s National Implementation Strategy on Climate Change, 
stressed also the corresponding benefits, for example: lower winter heating costs, longer growing 
seasons. This type of cool calculation, almost blandly “rational” from the vantage of national 
competitiveness, continues the long betrayal of Inuit peoples and exemplifies the narrowness of 
the national, rather than human or ecological, focus.  As with the current critique of U.S. actions 
noted earlier, Canada’s can also be seen as the action of a “rogue state” (Broadhead, 2001). The 
Harper government subsequently adopted and expanded this core agenda, seeing in the horror 
and danger of melting permafrost, unpredictable sea-ice conditions and myriad related symptoms 
of climate disease (Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, 2004) the chance to both further 
militarize the region, announcing armed ice breakers, a national sensor system, offshore patrol 
ships, additional rangers, and more (Harper press releases, as cited in Lackenbauer & Dean, 
2016). To secure “Canadian” sovereignty and further develop it, Harper sought to significantly 
boost “shipping, tourism and economic development in the Arctic Ocean region” (Harper, 2008). 
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  Canada, of course, is not alone in looking at a fragile, threatened, transnational region and 
seeing dollar signs and borders. With a U.S. Geological Survey (2009) confirming major oil and 
gas reserves, all states with an Arctic boundary began preparing in earnest to claim their “fair 
share” (USGS, 2008; Gautier et al., 2009), ushering in, as Scott Borgerson (2008) said, “a new 
scramble for territory and resources among the five Arctic powers” (p.63), all key beneficiaries 
of the era of industrial imperialism leading to the global climate change crisis they seek now not 
to solve but to cash in. And as ever, the concept spinning the wheel is “sovereignty.”    
  The tale is familiar. While there has long been widespread recognition that an adequate 
response to climate change necessitates a re-conceptualization of sovereignty (and with it, 
development), the centrality of sovereignty (and with it, militarized national security) has been 
upheld at every major environmental conference.   
   Consider the debate in 1972 between those attending the United Nations Conference on 
the Human Environment (better known as the Stockholm Conference) and those attending the 
Dai Dong Independent Conference, an alternative conference organized by the International 
Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR) and held (also in the Swedish capital) to highlight the limits 
of the orthodoxy guiding the official UN approach. The UN Conference has been acclaimed as 
the official beginning of the international community’s attempt to deal collectively with global 
environmental problems. While it is true that it acknowledged that environmental deterioration 
was not containable within state borders, the decisive (and logical) step toward a framework and 
ethos that moved beyond the rigid notion of state sovereignty—defined as the absolute right of a 
state to decide, in Waltz’s words, “for itself how it will cope with its internal and external 
problems” (Waltz, 1979 p. 96)—was not taken. Indeed, the Stockholm Declaration guaranteed 
“the sovereign rights of states to exploit their own resources in line with their own environmental 
policies,” while at the same time encouraging states to recognize “their responsibility to ensure 
that activities in their control do not damage the environment of other states” (UNCHE, 1972).  
  The tension between these two assertions—of sovereign rights and shared 
responsibilities—is, or should be, obvious and indeed was to those attending the Dai Dong 
Independent Conference. At that gathering, the participants united in arguing that no dependable 
solutions would be found unless basic social, political, and economic practices and structures 
were called into question. High on the Dai Dong agenda were the impacts (cultural as well as 
ecological) of industrial militarism, the ultimate threat posed (and damage already inflicted) by 
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nuclear militarism, the long-term implications for conventional economic growth models (and 
resource use), and the intimate connection between instability and inequity, the pernicious effects 
of grotesque wealth and power maldistribution. In sum, the indivisibility of ecology and 
economics was linked to the limitations of an international system focused on sovereign state 
rights and political and economic national advantage. Dai Dong saw the world, correctly I 
believe, “as a single functioning system in which nothing is independent” (Artin, 1973, p. 11), 
while the UN conference was stuck in the sovereignty-based mindset so linked to the very 
problems being discussed: 
… the issues which disunited the nations at Stockholm were precisely those that 
violated the ecological imperative of indivisibility: nationalism, ideological 
differences, sovereignty, and maldistribution. Each is inherently anti-ecological 
in that it divides and separates nations by territory politics, ideology, and 
profound differences in economic development. Each erodes a united co-
operative approach to the global problem of environmental degradation. Each 
stands in conflict with the common cause and common concern essential to the 
ecological imperative. (Knelman, 1972-73, pp. 39-40) 
 
   Alternative conferences such as that held in Stockholm were subsequently held alongside 
each of the major international environmental conferences as citizens tried to encourage their 
governments to work together in defense of global environmental security. Eventually some state 
leaders joined the chorus calling for a new way of thinking and acting. Indeed, following the 
2009 Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, with its movement away from the Kyoto 
process of binding (albeit insufficient) targets toward a new approach designed around vague, 
aspirational and non-binding targets, Evo Morales, the Indigenous President of Bolivia, stepped up 
to offer an alternative approach to the growing crisis. Morales sought to recast the climate change 
issue by hosting his own alternative conference, the World People’s Conference on Climate Change 
and the Rights of Mother Earth, in April 2010. The alternative proposal, known as the “People’s 
Agreement” emerging from that conference, reflected the demands of more than 30,000 delegates—
many representing Indigenous communities long marginalized or silenced by official diplomacy. 
Morales took the Agreement to the next global meeting of diplomats organized to deal with 
climate change in Cancun the following December: “We came to Cancun to save nature, forests, 
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planet Earth. We are not here to convert nature into a commodity. We have not come here to 
revitalize capitalism with carbon markets” (Morales, as cited in Vidal, 2010). While it is both 
predictable and lamentable that his appeal was rebuffed by his fellow leaders, it is perhaps still 
too early to gauge the long-term impact of the Agreement, and the appeal of its earth-centric 
ethos, in the wider political world. As it stands, however, we find ourselves today on a path 
warned against by Lothar Brock (1992) decades ago, with the militarization of environmental 
issues rather than the demilitarization of security issues. Although these repeated attempts to 
adopt a more radical, holistic stance have generally failed, serious efforts to avoid the pitfall 
identified by Brock have been made with respect to at least one region of immense ecological 
significance, the Arctic.  
An End to Inhumane Security: Rethinking Arctic “Sovereignty” 
  In 1987, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev took his call for a new vision of 
international politics to the Arctic, arguing in a speech in Murmansk that “a new, democratic 
philosophy of international relations, of world politics is breaking through”; a “new mode of 
thinking with its humane, universal criteria and values is penetrating diverse strata. Its strength 
lies in the fact that it accords with people’s common sense.” And what made sense, above all, in 
the Arctic, were common, cooperative efforts—an “integrated comprehensive plan for protecting 
the natural environment.” “We must hurry,” Gorbachev warned, “to protect the nature of the 
tundra, forest tundra, and the northern forest areas.”  Lamenting that the region was traditionally 
seen as a “problem of security,” and citing a build-up of Canadian forces, he argued that the 
“militarization of this part of the world is assuming threatening dimensions.” He beseeched, “Let 
the North of the globe become a zone of peace” (Gorbachev, as cited from Barentsinfo.org., 
1987). 
  There remained a blind-spot, however, in Gorbachev’s vision of a post state centric, 
demilitarized Arctic. His clarion call for cooperation was driven in part by the potential for joint 
ventures in what he called “rational” resource development, an “integral energy program” to 
share “boundless” oil and gas reserves for the common good. Because “extraction entails 
immense difficulties and the need to create unique technical installations capable of withstanding 
the Polar elements,” he elaborated, setting his environmentalism aside, it would be “reasonable 
to pool efforts in this endeavour” (Gorbachev, as cited from Barentsinfo.org., 1987). 
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  Though the Murmansk speech was farsighted, its fidelity to industrial, extractive 
economic development builds on, rather than breaks through, the tension inherent in the 1972 
UNEP declaration. Happily, to find an impressive blueprint for such a breakthrough, we need 
look no further than the Arctic itself.    
  The Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC)—a group bringing together the Indigenous Inuit 
peoples of Greenland, Canada, the United States and Russia—was established in 1977. At a 
recent conference, ICC chair Okalik Eegeesiak recalled that the Council “was initially 
envisioned by the respected Inupiat leader, Eben Hopson, to protect the rights of Inuit to 
sustainably harvest marine mammals critical to Inuit food security in the face of pending oil and 
gas development.” Hopson, Eegeesiak said, “understood that the Inuit voice was stronger 
through circumpolar solidarity.” The ICC has accomplished a great deal in the four decades 
since, and now enjoys consultative status at the United Nations. Vice Chair Hjalmar Dahl is right 
to declare that the “ICC has achieved a global reputation by defending and advocating for 
Indigenous Rights, including rights related to culture, food security, Indigenous Knowledge, and 
preservation of language,” and has “been instrumental in negotiations for international 
agreements to reduce contaminants reaching the Arctic, defended the Inuit right to be cold in a 
changing climate, and advocated for improved Inuit health, wellness and socio-economic status” 
(ICC, 2017). For the purposes of the paper, however, the ICC’s most significant contribution is 
its radical political and philosophical approach to “sovereignty”… 
“Sovereignty” is a term that has often been used to refer to the absolute and 
independent authority of a community or nation both internally and externally. 
Sovereignty is a contested concept, however, and does not have a fixed meaning. 
Old ideas of sovereignty are breaking down as different governance models, 
such as the European Union, evolve. Sovereignties overlap and are frequently 
divided within federations in creative ways to recognize the right of peoples. For 
Inuit living within the state of Russia, Canada, the USA and 
Denmark/Greenland, issues of sovereignty and sovereign rights must be 
examined and assessed in the context of our long history of struggle to gain 
recognition and respect as an Arctic indigenous people having the right to 
exercise self-determination over our lives, territories, cultures and languages. 
(ICC, 2009) 
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  This is not, to be sure, a call to end the existence of states. It is, rather, an 
acknowledgement that sovereignty is more fluid than we often suppose—a point states are often 
willing to accept when they deal with economic issues but, to date, less open to contemplating in 
the realm of environmental protection. For its part, the ICC offers a profound critique of the 
unnaturalness of state borders and demonstrates that truly sustainable peace and development 
requires a dramatic shift in the prevailing view of state-centric logic. “The conduct of 
international relations,” they argue, “must give primary respect to the need for global 
environmental security, the need for peaceful resolution of disputes and the inextricable linkages 
between issues of sovereignty and sovereign rights in the Arctic….” (ICC, 2009).  
Conclusion: Security, Sovereignty…and Power (Always Power) 
  To question the nature (and “naturalness”) of the state is to question the nature of 
political power itself. In her profoundly important challenge to the long-held orthodoxy linking 
power to violence, Hannah Arendt challenged the seemingly incontrovertible statement of C. 
Wright Mills that “all politics is a struggle for power; the ultimate power is violence” (Mills, as 
cited in Arendt, 1970, p. 35). Power in this view is understood as essentially “power over.” For 
Arendt (1970), in contrast, power “corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in 
concert” (p. 44). Considering power in this horizontal, shared manner, is foreign to most people, 
who tend, instead, to equate power with control, with domination, whereas for Arendt:    
…power comes into being only if and when men [and women] join themselves 
together for the purpose of action, and it will disappear when, for whatever 
reason, they disperse and desert one another. Hence, binding and promising, 
combining and covenanting are the means by which power is kept in existence; 
where and when men succeed in keeping intact power which sprang up between 
them during the course of any particular act or deed, they are already in the 
process of foundation, of constituting a stable worldly structure to house, as it 
were, their combined power of action. (Arendt, 1965, p. 174) 
 
  Despite enormous suffering, the Inuit have never forgotten, as so many Eurocentric 
“modern” people have, that because artificial borders must not be allowed to divide that which is 
indivisible—the ecological integrity of the natural environment—power can only be attained 
when humans act in concert with each other and within the natural environment that surrounds 
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us. It is worth noting that UN conference in Stockholm in 1972 used Human Environment in its 
title, which is somewhat curious for, as Artin (1973) argues, this is “at the very least a 
questionable proposition” precisely because “environment…as its etymology indicates, [is] that 
which encircles, or surrounds” (p. 17). The participants at the Dai Dong conference pointed out 
that it is not a “human environment” but an “environment of which humans are a part.” This is 
much closer to the Inuit view. 
  In his “indigenous manifesto,” Peace, Power, Righteousness, Taiaiake Alfred (Mohawk) 
pointed to the usefulness of Michel Foucault’s work:  
A critique of state power that sees oppression as an inevitable function of the state, even 
when it is constrained by a constitutionally defined social-political contract should have 
special resonance for indigenous peoples, since their nations were never party to any 
contract and yet have been forced to operate within a framework that presupposes the 
legitimacy of state sovereignty over then. Arguing for rights within that framework only 
reinforces the state’s anti-historic claim to sovereignty by contract. (Alfred, 1999, p. 48) 
Indigenous social theory (and practice), as Alfred pointed out, opposes the concept not only of 
power as “power over” other human beings, but human “power over” the natural world. He 
further stressed: 
The traditional indigenous view of power has nothing to do with competition, or status 
vis-à-vis others: it focuses on whether or not power is used in a way that contributes to 
the creation and maintenance of balance and peaceful coexistence in a web of 
relationships.…Where differences in the understanding of power come into play is in the 
various forms power can take, and the spiritual elements of the natural order that regulate 
and structure the expression of power in the temporal world. (Alfred, 1999, p. 49) 
And in a beautiful distillation of that subtle, sophisticated—and, to state-centric ears, unfamiliar 
and unworkable—idea, he defines power as “the force needed by all to achieve peace and 
harmony” (Alfred, 1999, p. 49).  
  As the eloquent but urgent promptings of the ICC show us, this is the kind of power—the 
way of thinking we need—to save ourselves and planet now endangered by the imperious 
application of the opposite, oppositional concept of power as “power over” that finds its ultimate 
expression in the vicious-cycle of “sovereign” violence of military and economic war. The 
Declaration powerfully problematizes and undermines the dominant discourse of power and 
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sovereignty, offering instead a vision of shared power, a new (and ancient) natural logic of 
mutual enablement exposing the folly and false claims of militaristic state-sovereignty. Building 
wide-spread support at a popular level for this vision is of crucial importance if we are to 
survive.   
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